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Low-Level Attacks in Bitcoin Wallets

  • Andriana GkaniatsouEmail author
  • Myrto Arapinis
  • Aggelos Kiayias
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10599)

Abstract

As with every financially oriented protocol, there has been a great interest in studying, verifying, attacking, identifying problems, and proposing solutions for Bitcoin. Within that scope, it is highly recommended that the keys of user accounts are stored offline. To that end, companies provide solutions that range from paper wallets to tamper-resistant smart-cards, offering different level of security. While incorporating expensive hardware for the wallet purposes is though to bring guarantees, it is often that the low-level implementations introduce exploitable back-doors. This paper aims to bring to attention how the overlooked low-level protocols that implement the hardware wallets can be exploited to mount Bitcoin attacks. To demonstrate that, we analyse the general protocol behind Ledger Wallets, the only EAL5+ certified against side channel analysis attacks hardware. In this work we conduct a throughout analysis on the Ledger Wallet communication protocol and show how to successfully attack it in practice. We address the lack of well-defined security properties that Bitcoin wallets should conform by articulating a minimal threat model against which any hardware wallet should defend. We further use that threat model to propose a lightweight fix that can be adopted by different technologies.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Andriana Gkaniatsou
    • 1
    Email author
  • Myrto Arapinis
    • 1
  • Aggelos Kiayias
    • 1
  1. 1.School of InformaticsUniversity of EdinburghEdinburghUK

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