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Rate-One AE with Security Under RUP

  • Shoichi Hirose
  • Yu Sasaki
  • Kan Yasuda
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10599)

Abstract

This paper investigates what sort of security can be retained by the most efficient (namely, rate-one) AE schemes like OCB under the release of unverified plaintext (RUP). At CT-RSA 2016, Chakraborti et al. have presented an impossibility result, which says that any rate-one AE scheme cannot ensure INT-RUP, a strong integrity requirement under RUP. In this paper we show that any rate-one AE scheme cannot satisfy PA2 (plaintext awareness 2) either, a strong privacy requirement under RUP introduced by Andreeva et al. at Asiacrypt 2014. Given these impossibility results, we relax the security requirements and identify new notions of tag-PA and tag-INT. The new notions are strictly weaker than PA2 and INT-RUP yet have considerable significance in the practical sense. In particular, tag-PA is strictly stronger than PA1 defined by Andreeva et al. at Asiacrypt 2014. Unfortunately, OCB is neither tag-PA nor tag-INT. We present a new rate-one AE scheme which is both tag-PA and tag-INT. The new scheme is essentially as efficient as OCB, consuming just one extra call to a block cipher.

Keywords

AE Decryption misuse RUP Rate-one Tag feedback OCB 

Supplementary material

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of FukuiFukuiJapan
  2. 2.NTT Secure Platform LaboratoriesTokyoJapan

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