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Rename and False-Name Manipulations in Discrete Facility Location with Optional Preferences

  • Tomohiro OnoEmail author
  • Taiki Todo
  • Makoto Yokoo
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10621)

Abstract

We consider the problem of locating facilities on a discrete acyclic graph, where agents’ locations are publicly known and the agents are requested to report their demands, i.e., which facilities they want to access. In this paper, we study the effect of manipulations by agents that utilize vacant vertices. Such manipulations are called rename or false-name manipulations in game theory and mechanism design literature. For locating one facility on a path, we carefully compare our model with traditional ones and clarify their differences by pointing out that some existing results in the traditional model do not carry over to our model. For locating two facilities, we analyze the existing and new mechanisms from a perspective of approximation ratio and provide non-trivial lower bounds. Finally, we introduce a new mechanism design model where richer information is available to the mechanism designer and show that under the new model false-name-proofness does not always imply population monotonicity.

Notes

Acknowledgement

This work was partially supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grants Number 17H00761 and 17H04695.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Graduate School of Information Science and Electrical EngineeringKyushu UniversityFukuokaJapan

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