The U.S. Vulnerabilities Equities Process: An Economic Perspective

  • Tristan CaulfieldEmail author
  • Christos Ioannidis
  • David Pym
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10575)


The U.S. Vulnerabilities Equities Process (VEP) is used by the government to decide whether to retain or disclose zero day vulnerabilities that the government possesses. There are costs and benefits to both actions: disclosing the vulnerability allows the vulnerability to be patched and systems to be made more secure, while retaining the vulnerability allows the government to conduct intelligence, offensive national security, and law enforcement activities. While redacted documents give some information about the organization of the VEP, very little is publicly known about the decision-making process itself, with most of the detail about the criteria used coming from a blog post by Michael Daniel, the former White House Cybersecurity Coordinator. Although the decision to disclose or retain a vulnerability is often considered a binary choice—to either disclose or retain—it should actually be seen as a decision about timing: to determine when to disclose. In this paper, we present a model that shows how the criteria could be combined to determine the optimal time for the government to disclose a vulnerability, with the aim of providing insight into how a more formal, repeatable decision-making process might be achieved. We look at how the recent case of the WannaCry malware, which made use of a leaked NSA zero day exploit, EternalBlue, can be interpreted using the model.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Tristan Caulfield
    • 1
    Email author
  • Christos Ioannidis
    • 2
  • David Pym
    • 1
    • 3
  1. 1.University College LondonLondonEngland
  2. 2.Aston Business SchoolBirminghamEngland
  3. 3.The Alan Turing InstituteLondonEngland

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