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Public Evidence from Secret Ballots

  • Matthew BernhardEmail author
  • Josh Benaloh
  • J. Alex Halderman
  • Ronald L. Rivest
  • Peter Y. A. Ryan
  • Philip B. Stark
  • Vanessa Teague
  • Poorvi L. Vora
  • Dan S. Wallach
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10615)

Abstract

Elections seem simple—aren’t they just about counting? But they have a unique, challenging combination of security and privacy requirements. The stakes are high; the context is adversarial; the electorate needs to be convinced that the results are correct; and the secrecy of the ballot must be ensured. They also have practical constraints: time is of the essence, and voting systems need to be affordable and maintainable, as well as usable by voters, election officials, and pollworkers. It is thus not surprising that voting is a rich research area spanning theory, applied cryptography, practical systems analysis, usable security, and statistics. Election integrity involves two key concepts: convincing evidence that outcomes are correct and privacy, which amounts to convincing assurance that there is no evidence about how any given person voted. These are obviously in tension. We examine how current systems walk this tightrope.

Notes

Acknowledgments

This work was supported in part by the U.S. National Science Foundation awards CNS-1345254, CNS-1409505, CNS-1518888, CNS-1409401, CNS-1314492, and CNS-1421373, the Center for Science of Information STC (CSoI), an NSF Science and Technology Center, under grant agreement CCF-0939370, the Maryland Procurement Office under contract H98230-14-C-0127, and FNR Luxembourg under the PETRVS Mobility grant.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Matthew Bernhard
    • 2
    Email author
  • Josh Benaloh
    • 1
  • J. Alex Halderman
    • 2
  • Ronald L. Rivest
    • 8
  • Peter Y. A. Ryan
    • 3
  • Philip B. Stark
    • 4
  • Vanessa Teague
    • 6
  • Poorvi L. Vora
    • 7
  • Dan S. Wallach
    • 5
  1. 1.Microsoft ResearchRedmondUSA
  2. 2.University of MichiganAnn ArborUSA
  3. 3.University of LuxembourgLuxembourg CityLuxembourg
  4. 4.University of California at BerkeleyBerkeleyUSA
  5. 5.Rice UniversityHoustonUSA
  6. 6.University of MelbourneMelbourneAustralia
  7. 7.The George Washington UniversityWashingtonUSA
  8. 8.Massachusetts Institute of TechnologyCambridgeUSA

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