Routing Game on the Line: The Case of Multi-players
In this paper, we tackle the problem of a sequential routing game where multiple users coexist and competitively send their traffic to a destination over a line. The users arrive at time epoch with a given capacity. Then, they ship their demands over time on a shared resource. The state of players evolve according to whether they decide to transmit or not. The decision of each user is thus spatio-temporal control. We provide an explicit expression of the equilibrium of such systems and compare it to the global optimum case. In particular, we determine the expression of price of anarchy of such scheme and identify a Braess-type paradox in the context of sequential routing game.
KeywordsSequential routing game Nash equilibrium Price of anarchy Braess-type paradox
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