Tree-Based Cryptographic Access Control

Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10492)

Abstract

As more and more data is outsourced to third party servers, the enforcement of access control policies using cryptographic techniques becomes increasingly important. Enforcement schemes based on symmetric cryptography typically issue users a small amount of secret material which, in conjunction with public information, allows the derivation of decryption keys for all data objects for which they are authorized.

We generalize the design of prior enforcement schemes by mapping access control policies to a graph-based structure. Unlike prior work, we envisage that this structure may be defined independently of the policy to target different efficiency goals; the key issue then is how best to map policies to such structures. To exemplify this approach, we design a space-efficient KAS based on a binary tree which imposes a logarithmic bound on the required number of derivations whilst eliminating public information. In the worst case, users may require more cryptographic material than in prior schemes; we mitigate this by designing heuristic optimizations of the mapping and show through experimental results that our scheme performs well compared to existing schemes.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Royal HollowayUniversity of LondonEghamUK

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