Analyzing the Capabilities of the CAN Attacker

Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10492)

Abstract

The modern car is controlled by a large number of Electronic Control Units (ECUs), which communicate over a network of bus systems. One of the most widely used bus types is called Controller Area Network (CAN). Recent automotive hacking has shown that attacks with severe safety impact are possible when an attacker manages to gain access to a safety-critical CAN. In this paper, our goal is to obtain a more systematic understanding of the capabilities of the CAN attacker, which can support the development of security concepts for in-vehicle networks.

Notes

Acknowledgement

This work is supported by the Niedersächsisches Vorab of the Volkswagen Foundation and the Ministry of Science and Culture of Lower Saxony as part of the Interdisciplinary Research Center on Critical Systems Engineering for Socio-Technical Systems.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.OFFIS & University of OldenburgOldenburgGermany
  2. 2.University of OldenburgOldenburgGermany

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