Uniform Model Interface for Assurance Case Integration with System Models

Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10489)


Assurance cases are developed and maintained in parallel with corresponding system models and therefore need to reference each other. Managing the correctness and consistency of interrelated safety argument and system models is essential for system dependability and is a nontrivial task. The model interface presented in this paper enables a uniform process of establishing and managing assurance case references to various types of system models. References to system metamodels are specified in an argument pattern and then used for assurance case instantiation. The proposed approach permits incremental development of assurance cases that maintain consistency with corresponding system models throughout the system development life cycle.


Assurance case Safety case System models Argument pattern 


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Gdańsk University of TechnologyGdańskPoland
  2. 2.ArgevideGdańskPoland
  3. 3.US Food and Drug AdministrationSilver SpringUSA

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