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Arguing on Software-Level Verification Techniques Appropriateness

  • Carmen CârlanEmail author
  • Barbara Gallina
  • Severin Kacianka
  • Ruth Breu
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10488)

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate the pondered selection of innovative software verification technology in the safety-critical domain and its implications. Verification tools perform analyses, testing or simulation activities. The compliance of the techniques implemented by these tools to fulfill standard-mandated objectives (i.e., to be means of compliance in the context of DO-178C and related supplements) should be explained to the certification body. It is thereby difficult for practitioners to use novel techniques, without a systematic method for arguing their appropriateness. Thus, we offer a method for arguing the appropriate application of a certain verification technique (potentially in combination with other techniques) to produce the evidence needed to satisfy certification objectives regarding fault detection and mitigation in a realistic avionics application via safety cases. We use this method for the choice of an appropriate compiler to support the development of a drone.

Keywords

Safety cases Faults Standard compliance Verification techniques 

Notes

Acknowledgements

This work has been partially sponsored by the Austrian Ministry for Transport, Innovation and Technology (IKT der Zukunft, Project SALSA) and the Munich Center for Internet Research (MCIR). The author B. Gallina is financially supported by the ECSEL JU project AMASS (No. 692474).

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Carmen Cârlan
    • 1
    Email author
  • Barbara Gallina
    • 2
  • Severin Kacianka
    • 3
  • Ruth Breu
    • 4
  1. 1.fortiss GmbHMunichGermany
  2. 2.Mälardalen UniversityVästeråsSweden
  3. 3.Technische Universität MünchenGarchingGermany
  4. 4.Institut für InformatikInnsbruckAustria

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