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Building Trust, Removing Doubt? Robustness Analysis and Climate Modeling

  • Jay Odenbaugh
Chapter

Abstract

In this chapter, Odenbaugh first provides a conceptual framework for thinking about climate modeling, specifically focused on general circulation models. Second, he considers what makes models independent of one another. Third, he shows robustness analysis, which depends on models being independent of one another, can be used to remove doubts about idealizations in general climate models. Finally, he considers a dilemma for robustness analysis; namely, it leads to either an infinite regress of idealizations or a complete removal of idealizations. A response to the dilemma is given defending a form of epistemic contextualism and by drawing a distinction between relative and absolute robustness.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jay Odenbaugh
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyLewis and Clark CollegePortlandUSA

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