Feferman and the Truth

Chapter
First Online:
Part of the Outstanding Contributions to Logic book series (OCTR, volume 13)

Abstract

We outline some of Feferman’s main contributions to the theory of truth and the motivations behind them. In particular, we sketch the role truth can play in the foundations of mathematics and in the formulation of reflection principles, systems of ramified truth, several variants of the Kripke–Feferman theory, a deflationist theory in an extension of classical logic, and the system for determinate truth.

Keywords

Axiomatic theories of truth Ramified truth Kripke–Feferman theory Reflective closure Determinate truth 

2010 Mathematics Subject Classification

03F03 03F25 03F35 3F40 03A05. 
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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Andrea Cantini
    • 1
  • Kentaro Fujimoto
    • 2
  • Volker Halbach
    • 3
  1. 1.Dipartimento di Lettere e FilosofiaUniversitá di FirenzeFirenzeItaly
  2. 2.Department of Philosophy and School of MathematicsUniversity of BristolBristolEngland
  3. 3.University of OxfordOxfordEngland

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