Hintikka’s Knowledge and Belief in Flux

  • Vincent F. HendricksEmail author
  • Rasmus K. RendsvigEmail author
Part of the Outstanding Contributions to Logic book series (OCTR, volume 12)


Hintikka’s Knowledge and Belief from 1962 is considered the seminal treatise on epistemic logic. It provides the nuts and bolts of what is now a flourishing paradigm of significance to philosophy, economics, mathematics and theoretical computer science—in theory as well as practice. And in theory and for practice epistemic logic has been extensively articulated, refined and developed especially with respect to capturing the dynamics of reasoning about knowledge. But although the robust narrative about Hintikka’s epistemic logic is rather static, the leap to dynamic epistemic logic is right there back in 1962 as this paper will show.


Jaakko Hintikka epistemology formal epistemology epistemic logic dynamic epistemic logic public announcement arbitrary announcement 


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© Springer International Publishing AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.CIBS, Center for Information and Bubble Studies, University of CopenhagenCopenhagenDenmark
  2. 2.LUIQ, Theoretical Philosophy, Lund UniversityLundSweden

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