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Foreign Policy by Stealth: Kuwait and the Arab Spring

  • James Bowden
Chapter

Abstract

Kuwait’s foreign policy in the Arab Spring was to maintain its support of various Arab governments financially and diplomatically and appear to be active within the Gulf region and beyond. Its response was geared towards foreign policy by press release, since the moves it made were less substantial than the headlines indicated. Previously, its status as a small Gulf state did not act as a limit to its foreign policy options, but its history has made it wary of overt involvement in events that could spill over into its domestic sphere and produce unmanageable results.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • James Bowden
    • 1
  1. 1.Independent ResearcherTampaUSA

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