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Applying a Dependency Mechanism for Voting Protocol Models Using Event-B

  • J. Paul Gibson
  • Souad Kherroubi
  • Dominique MéryEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10321)

Abstract

The design of e-voting systems requires the use of techniques which guarantee that the resulting system is safe, secure and preserves privacy. We develop Event-B models of a voting system, by applying a decomposition pattern and a technique of contextualisation, using a dependency mechanism. Through refinement, we take into account the precise regulation and structure of a specific voting process, and reason formally about the system’s resistence to common attacks and threats.

Keywords

Voting Process Honest Voters Corrupted Signals Weak Fairness Assumption Voting Record 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© IFIP International Federation for Information Processing 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • J. Paul Gibson
    • 1
  • Souad Kherroubi
    • 2
  • Dominique Méry
    • 2
    Email author
  1. 1.Telecom Sud Paris, SAMOVAR UMR 5157 CNRS Research Laboratory, METHODES TeamÉvryFrance
  2. 2.Université de Lorraine, LORIA UMR 7503 CNRS Research Laboratory, MOSEL TeamNancyFrance

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