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Attribution of Economic Denial of Sustainability Attacks in Public Clouds

  • Mohammad Karami
  • Songqing ChenEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering book series (LNICST, volume 198)

Abstract

The cloud pricing model leaves cloud consumers vulnerable to Economic Denial of Sustainability (EDoS) attacks. In this type of attacks, an adversary first identifies web resources with high levels of cloud resource consumption, and then uses a botnet of compromised hosts to make fraudulent requests to these costly web resources. The attacker’s goal is to disrupt the economical sustainability of the victim by inflicting cost through fraudulent consumption of billable cloud resources.

In this paper, we propose two different Markov-based models to profile the behavior of legitimate users in terms of their resource consumption and to detect malicious sources engaged in fraudulent use of cloud resources. Our experimental evaluation results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed attribution methodology for identifying malicious sources participating in EDoS attacks.

Keywords

Economic Denial of Sustainability EDoS detection Markov chain Hidden semi Markov model 

Notes

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank anonymous reviewers for their comments. This work was supported in part by an ARO grant W911NF-15-1-0262 and a NSF grant CNS-1524462.

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Copyright information

© ICST Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceGeorge Mason UniversityFairfaxUSA

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