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Concurrently Composable Security with Shielded Super-Polynomial Simulators

  • Brandon Broadnax
  • Nico Döttling
  • Gunnar Hartung
  • Jörn Müller-Quade
  • Matthias NagelEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10210)

Abstract

We propose a new framework for concurrently composable security that relaxes the security notion of UC security. As in previous frameworks, our notion is based on the idea of providing the simulator with super-polynomial resources. However, in our new framework simulators are only given restricted access to the results computed in super-polynomial time. This is done by modeling the super-polynomial resource as a stateful oracle that may directly interact with a functionality without the simulator seeing the communication. We call these oracles “shielded oracles”.

Our notion is fully compatible with the UC framework, i.e., protocols proven secure in the UC framework remain secure in our framework. Furthermore, our notion lies strictly between SPS and Angel-based security, while being closed under protocol composition.

Shielding away super-polynomial resources allows us to apply new proof techniques where we can replace super-polynomial entities by indistinguishable polynomially bounded entities. This allows us to construct secure protocols in the plain model using weaker primitives than in previous Angel-based protocols. In particular, we only use non-adaptive-CCA-secure commitments as a building block in our constructions.

As a feasibility result, we present a constant-round general MPC protocol in the plain model based on standard polynomial-time hardness assumptions that is secure in our framework. Our protocol can be made fully black-box. As a consequence, we obtain the first black-box construction of a constant-round concurrently secure general MPC protocol in the plain model based on polynomial-time hardness assumptions.

Keywords

Secure Protocol Commitment Scheme Oblivious Transfer Modular Analysis Composition Theorem 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Brandon Broadnax
    • 1
  • Nico Döttling
    • 2
  • Gunnar Hartung
    • 1
  • Jörn Müller-Quade
    • 1
  • Matthias Nagel
    • 1
    Email author
  1. 1.Karlsruhe Institute of TechnologyKarlsruheGermany
  2. 2.University of California BerkeleyBerkeleyUSA

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