# New Collision Attacks on Round-Reduced Keccak

## Abstract

In this paper, we focus on collision attacks against Keccak hash function family and some of its variants. Following the framework developed by Dinur *et al.* at FSE 2012 where 4-round collisions were found by combining 3-round differential trails and 1-round connectors, we extend the connectors one round further hence achieve collision attacks for up to 5 rounds. The extension is possible thanks to the large degree of freedom of the wide internal state. By linearization of all S-boxes of the first round, the problem of finding solutions of 2-round connectors are converted to that of solving a system of linear equations. However, due to the quick freedom reduction from the linearization, the system has solution only when the 3-round differential trails satisfy some additional conditions. We develop a dedicated differential trail search strategy and find such special differentials indeed exist. As a result, the first practical collision attack against 5-round SHAKE128 and two 5-round instances of the Keccak collision challenges are found with real examples. We also give the first results against 5-round Keccak-224 and 6-round Keccak collision challenges. It is remarked that the work here is still far from threatening the security of the full 24-round Keccak family.

## Keywords

Keccak SHA-3 Hash function Linearization Differential## Notes

### Acknowledgement

The authors would like to thank anonymous reviewers and Joan Daemen for their helpful comments and suggestions. The work of this paper was supported by the National Key Basic Research Program of China (2013CB834203) and the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grants 61472417, 61472415, 61402469, and 61672516).

## Supplementary material

## References

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