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Faster Secure Two-Party Computation in the Single-Execution Setting

  • Xiao WangEmail author
  • Alex J. Malozemoff
  • Jonathan Katz
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10212)

Abstract

We propose a new protocol for two-party computation, secure against malicious adversaries, that is significantly faster than prior work in the single-execution setting (i.e., non-amortized and with no pre-processing). In particular, for computational security parameter \({\kappa }\) and statistical security parameter \({\rho }\), our protocol uses only \({\rho }\) garbled circuits and \(O({\rho }+ {\kappa })\) public-key operations, whereas previous work with the same number of garbled circuits required either \(O({\rho }\cdot n+{\kappa })\) public-key operations (where n is the input/output length) or a second execution of a secure-computation sub-protocol. Our protocol can be based on the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption in the standard model.

We implement our protocol to evaluate its performance. With \({\rho }=40\), our implementation securely computes an AES evaluation in 65 ms over a local-area network using a single thread without any pre-computation, \(22\times \) faster than the best prior work in the non-amortized setting. The relative performance of our protocol is even better for functions with larger input/output lengths.

Keywords

Oblivious Transfer Input Length Malicious Adversary Output Wire Evaluation Circuit 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgments

The authors thank Samuel Ranellucci and Yan Huang for helpful discussions and comments.

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Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of MarylandCollege ParkUSA
  2. 2.GaloisPortlandUSA

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