Fictionalism

  • William Lane Craig
Chapter
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Abstract

Fictionalism accepts the neo-Quinean criterion of ontological commitment but denies that sentences involving quantification over or singular terms referring to abstract objects are true. The work of Hartry Field and Mark Balaguer serves to represent this approach. Fictionalism is defended against objections based on the obvious truth of elementary mathematics, the indispensability/applicability of mathematics, and the alleged incoherence of fictionalism. Fictionalism is found to be a viable option for theists who accept the traditional criterion of ontological commitment; but doubts about that criterion are expressed.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • William Lane Craig
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.Talbot School of TheologyBiola UniversityLa MiradaUSA
  2. 2.Houston Baptist UniversityHoustonUSA

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