Abstract
Law traditionally divides reality into persons and things. This dualistic approach is no longer able to adequately respond to many ethical challenges facing the contemporary legal systems. The paper discusses the idea of an intermediate category of non-personal subjects of law. It is primarily aimed at defining the legal status of non-human sentient animals, but it may also be applicable to addressing the controversies caused by some other types of creatures. Non-personal subjects of law differ from objects (things) through the recognition of their ability to have their own subjective interests that matter ethically and legally. However, they also differ from the natural and juristic persons by the inability to have most of the rights traditionally attributed to persons. They hold only one single right – to be taken into account. The essence of this right is to have the vital subjective interests of an individual creature taken into consideration in all decisions that may substantially affect them. In many cases they have to be balanced and may be outweighed by other conflicting reasons. Nonetheless, they must not be ignored and their balancing is testable by the general principle of proportionality. The author argues that the idea of non-personal subjects of law is preferable to the popular claims to grant animals the status of persons.
This paper has been prepared in course of the research project financed by the Polish National Centre of Science (2012/07/B/HS5/03957).
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Pietrzykowski, T. (2017). The Idea of Non-personal Subjects of Law. In: Kurki, V., Pietrzykowski, T. (eds) Legal Personhood: Animals, Artificial Intelligence and the Unborn. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 119. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53462-6_4
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