Improving the Verifiability of the Estonian Internet Voting Scheme

  • Sven HeibergEmail author
  • Tarvi Martens
  • Priit Vinkel
  • Jan Willemson
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10141)


We describe an update of the Estonian Internet Voting scheme targeted towards adding verification capabilities to the central system. We propose measures to ensure the auditability of the correctness of vote decryption and i-ballot box integrity. The latter will be improved to a level where it would be possible to outsource the vote collection process to an untrusted party and later fully verify the correctness of its operations.


Election Organizer Vote Result Eligible Voter Data Auditor Internet Vote 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.



This research has been supported by the Estonian Research Council under grant No. IUT27-1.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Sven Heiberg
    • 1
    • 2
    Email author
  • Tarvi Martens
    • 2
  • Priit Vinkel
    • 3
  • Jan Willemson
    • 4
    • 5
  1. 1.Smartmatic-Cybernetica Centre of Excellence for Internet VotingTartuEstonia
  2. 2.Electronic Voting CommitteeTallinnEstonia
  3. 3.Chancellery of Riigikogu, Secretariat of National Electoral CommitteeTallinnEstonia
  4. 4.CyberneticaTartuEstonia
  5. 5.Software Technology and Applications Competence CentreTartuEstonia

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