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Humanity—The Paragon of Cooperation?

  • Patrik Lindenfors
Chapter

Abstract

This is the crucial chapter upon which the book turns, outlining the problem with human cooperation; that it goes over and above the biological explanations of cooperation that we have discussed so far. The theory of strong reciprocity is presented, as well as many game theoretical experiments, their results and implications. Cultural group selection is discussed and the idea of cultural inheritance is introduced.

Keywords

Ultimatum Game Dictator Game Walk Away Human Cooperation Selfish Individual 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Centre for the Study of Cultural EvolutionStockholm UniversityStockholmSweden

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