Counterterrorism: A Public Goods Approach

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Abstract

This chapter employs the concepts of public goods and externalities to investigate myriad aspects of proactive and defensive counterterrorism policies. Such policies include degrading terrorist groups’ assets, hardening potential targets, securing border transit points, gathering intelligence, eliminating safe havens, and infiltrating terrorist groups. Counterterrorism actions possess opposing or re-enforcing externalities that create an amazing variety of strategic substitutes and complements. As such, the implications for leadership and/or unilateral action may be quite varied for alternative counterterrorism measures. By drawing on the private provision of public good model, joint products, and aggregator technology, this article serves to underscore the wide-ranging applicability of many theoretic constructs developed by Cornes and his co-authors.

Keywords

Nash Equilibrium Terrorist Attack Terrorist Group Foreign Asset Strategic Substitute 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Economics, School of Economic, Political and Policy SciencesUniversity of Texas at DallasRichardsonUSA

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