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SpecCert: Specifying and Verifying Hardware-Based Security Enforcement

  • Thomas LetanEmail author
  • Pierre Chifflier
  • Guillaume Hiet
  • Pierre Néron
  • Benjamin Morin
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9995)

Abstract

Over time, hardware designs have constantly grown in complexity and modern platforms involve multiple interconnected hardware components. During the last decade, several vulnerability disclosures have proven that trust in hardware can be misplaced. In this article, we give a formal definition of Hardware-based Security Enforcement (HSE) mechanisms, a class of security enforcement mechanisms such that a software component relies on the underlying hardware platform to enforce a security policy. We then model a subset of a x86-based hardware platform specifications and we prove the soundness of a realistic HSE mechanism within this model using Coq, a proof assistant system.

Keywords

Security Policy Software Component Computing Platform Hardware Architecture Cache Line 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Thomas Letan
    • 1
    • 2
    Email author
  • Pierre Chifflier
    • 1
  • Guillaume Hiet
    • 2
  • Pierre Néron
    • 1
  • Benjamin Morin
    • 1
  1. 1.French Network Information Security Agency (ANSSI)ParisFrance
  2. 2.CIDRE – Inria, IRISA, CentraleSupélecRennesFrance

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