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Using Attack-Defense Trees to Analyze Threats and Countermeasures in an ATM: A Case Study

  • Marlon Fraile
  • Margaret Ford
  • Olga Gadyatskaya
  • Rajesh Kumar
  • Mariëlle Stoelinga
  • Rolando Trujillo-Rasua
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing book series (LNBIP, volume 267)

Abstract

Securing automated teller machines (ATMs), as critical and complex infrastructure, requires a precise understanding of the associated threats. This paper reports on the application of attack-defense trees to model and analyze the security of ATMs. We capture the most dangerous multi-stage attack scenarios applicable to ATM structures, and establish a practical experience report, where we reflect on the process of modeling ATM threats via attack-defense trees. In particular, we share our insights into the benefits and drawbacks of attack-defense tree modeling, as well as best practices and lessons learned.

Keywords

Attack-defense trees Security modeling ATM security 

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Copyright information

© IFIP International Federation for Information Processing 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Marlon Fraile
    • 1
  • Margaret Ford
    • 2
  • Olga Gadyatskaya
    • 3
  • Rajesh Kumar
    • 4
  • Mariëlle Stoelinga
    • 4
  • Rolando Trujillo-Rasua
    • 3
  1. 1.GMVMadridSpain
  2. 2.Consult HyperionGuildfordUK
  3. 3.University of Luxembourg, SnTEsch-sur-AlzetteLuxembourg
  4. 4.University of TwenteEnschedeNetherlands

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