Theoretical Framework
Abstract
When we speak of insecurity, we really mean a state’s degree of susceptibility to a specific vulnerability or threat. Security then, actually means resilience to vulnerability or threat. Vulnerability degrades the purpose of the state: survival as an independent political unit within an anarchic international system. Threats transcend military matters, incorporating economic, environmental, health and safety, political, society and cyber sources. These threats, or vulnerabilities, have the power to destroy the lives that produced the state. Concentrating on military matters compels us to overlook exposure to other life-threatening vulnerabilities. This chapter highlights the systemic aspect of vulnerability and its distribution across units that create and recreate the international systemic order. It builds a theoretical framework that will explain the specific systemic vulnerabilities.
Keywords
Public Good Weak State Great Power International System Negative ExternalityWorks Cited
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