Software Architectures for Self-protection in IaaS Clouds

  • K. R. JayaramEmail author
  • Aleksandar Milenkoski
  • Samuel Kounev


In this chapter, we focus on software architectures for self-protection in IaaS clouds. IaaS clouds, especially hybrid clouds, are becoming increasingly popular because of the need for developers and enterprises to dynamically increase/decrease their use of computing resources to adapt quickly to market forces and customer demands, reduce costs, and increase fault tolerance. However, the adoption of public IaaS and hybrid clouds by enterprises is slower than expected because the current hybrid cloud infrastructures do not provide scalable and efficient mechanisms to prevent software tampering and configuration errors and ensure the trustworthiness and integrity of the software stack executing a hybrid application workload; or to enforce governmental privacy and audit regulations by ensuring that remote data and computation do not cross specified geographic boundaries. We discuss the recent research on integrating intrusion detection systems in IaaS infrastructures, as well as hardware-rooted integrity verification and geographic fencing to address the concerns outlined above.


Virtual Machine Software Architecture Intrusion Detection System Cloud Provider Cloud Service Provider 
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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • K. R. Jayaram
    • 1
    Email author
  • Aleksandar Milenkoski
    • 2
  • Samuel Kounev
    • 2
  1. 1.IBM Thomas J. Watson Research CenterNew York CityUSA
  2. 2.University of WurzburgWürzburgGermany

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