Network Elicitation in Adversarial Environment

  • Marcin DziubińskiEmail author
  • Piotr Sankowski
  • Qiang Zhang
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9996)


We study a problem of a defender who wants to protect a network against contagious attack by an intelligent adversary. The defender could only protect a fixed number of nodes and does not know the network. Each of the nodes in the network does not know the network either, but knows his/her neighbours only. We propose an incentive compatible mechanism allowing the defender to elicit information about the whole network. The mechanism is efficient in the sense that under truthful reports it assigns the protection optimally.


Incentive Compatibility Infected Node Allocation Function Residual Network Truthful Mechanism 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Marcin Dziubiński
    • 1
    Email author
  • Piotr Sankowski
    • 1
  • Qiang Zhang
    • 1
  1. 1.Institute of InformaticsUniversity of WarsawWarsawPoland

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