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Strategies for Voter-Initiated Election Audits

  • Chris CulnaneEmail author
  • Vanessa Teague
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9996)

Abstract

Many verifiable electronic voting systems are dependent on voter-initiated auditing. This auditing allows the voter to check the construction of their cryptographic ballot, and is essential in both gaining assurance in the honesty of the constructing device, and ensuring the integrity of the election as a whole. A popular audit approach is the Benaloh Challenge [5], which involves first constructing the complete ballot, before asking the voter whether they wish to cast or audit it.

In this paper we model the Benaloh Challenge as an inspection game, and evaluate various voter strategies for deciding whether to cast or audit their ballot. We shall show that the natural strategies for voter-initiated auditing do not form Nash equilibria, assuming a payoff matrix that describes remote voting. This prevents authorities from providing voters with a sensible auditing strategy. We will also show that when the constructing device has prior knowledge of how a voter might vote, it critically undermines the effectiveness of the auditing. This is particularly relevant to internet voting systems, some of which also rely on Benaloh Challenges for their auditing step.

A parallel version, in which the voter constructs multiple ballots and then chooses which one to vote with, can form Nash equilibria. It still relies on some uncertainty about which one the voter will choose.

Keywords

Nash Equilibrium Remote Setting Audit Strategy Electronic Vote System Voter Intent 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgments

Thanks to Wojtek Jamroga, Ron Rivest, and Josh Benaloh for interesting conversations about this work.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Computing and Information Systems, Melbourne School of EngineeringUniversity of MelbourneParkvilleAustralia

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