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A Model-Based Approach to Secure Multiparty Distributed Systems

  • Najah Ben Said
  • Takoua Abdellatif
  • Saddek Bensalem
  • Marius Bozga
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9952)

Abstract

Within distributed systems with completely distributed interactions between parties with mutual distrust, it is hard to control the (illicit) flowing of private information to unintended parties. Unlike existing methods dealing with verification of low-level cryptographic protocols, we propose a novel model-based approach based on model transformations to build a secure-by-construction multiparty distributed system. First, starting from a component-based model of the system, the designer annotates different parts of it in order to define the security policy. Then, the security is checked and when valid, a secure distributed model, consistent with the desired security policy, is automatically generated. To illustrate the approach, we present a framework that implements our method and use it to secure an online social network application.

Keywords

Information Flow Security Policy Security Level Security Condition Covert Channel 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Najah Ben Said
    • 1
    • 2
  • Takoua Abdellatif
    • 3
  • Saddek Bensalem
    • 1
    • 2
  • Marius Bozga
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.Univ. Grenoble Alpes, VERIMAGGrenobleFrance
  2. 2.CNRS, VERIMAGGrenobleFrance
  3. 3.Tunisia Polytechnic SchoolUniversity of CarthageTunisTunisia

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