Social Welfare in One-Sided Matching Mechanisms

  • George Christodoulou
  • Aris Filos-Ratsikas
  • Søren Kristoffer Stiil Frederiksen
  • Paul W. Goldberg
  • Jie Zhang
  • Jinshan Zhang
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10002)


We study the Price of Anarchy of mechanisms for the well-known problem of one-sided matching, or house allocation, with respect to the social welfare objective. We consider both ordinal mechanisms, where agents submit preference lists over the items, and cardinal mechanisms, where agents may submit numerical values for the items being allocated. We present a general lower bound of \(\varOmega (\sqrt{n})\) on the Price of Anarchy, which applies to all mechanisms. We show that two well-known mechanisms, Probabilistic Serial, and Random Priority, achieve a matching upper bound. We extend our lower bound to the Price of Stability of a large class of mechanisms that satisfy a common proportionality property, and show stronger bounds on the Price of Anarchy of all deterministic mechanisms.


Nash Equilibrium Strategy Profile Valuation Function Safe Strategy Preference List 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.



The authors would like to thank Piotr Krysta for useful discussion.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • George Christodoulou
    • 1
  • Aris Filos-Ratsikas
    • 2
  • Søren Kristoffer Stiil Frederiksen
    • 3
  • Paul W. Goldberg
    • 2
  • Jie Zhang
    • 2
  • Jinshan Zhang
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of LiverpoolLiverpoolUK
  2. 2.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of OxfordOxfordUK
  3. 3.Department of Computer ScienceAarhus UniversityAarhusDenmark

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