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Extension of Meet-in-the-Middle Technique for Truncated Differential and Its Application to RoadRunneR

  • Qianqian Yang
  • Lei HuEmail author
  • Siwei Sun
  • Ling Song
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9955)

Abstract

In the FSE 2015 conference, Li et al. introduced a new method to construct differential characteristics of block ciphers by exploiting the meet-in-the-middle like technique. Inspired by the method, in this paper we obtain general results on truncated differential characteristics of block ciphers with Feistel structure. Applying the result to RoadRunneR, which is a fast bit-slice lightweight block cipher proposed in the LightSec 2015 conference for low cost 8-bit processors, we find 5-round truncated differential characteristics with probability \(2^{-56}\). Using the truncated differential characteristics, we present a attack on 7-round RoadRunneR-128 without whitening keys, with data complexity of \(2^{55}\) chosen plaintexts, time complexity of \(2^{121}\) encryptions, and memory complexity of \(2^{68}\). This is the currently best known attack on RoadRunneR block cipher.

Keywords

Truncated differential Meet-in-the-middle technique Lightweight block cipher RoadRunneR 

Notes

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions. The work of this paper was supported by the National Key Basic Research Program of China (2013CB834203), the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grants 61472417, 61402469 and 61472415), the Strategic Priority Research Program of Chinese Academy of Sciences under Grant XDA06010702, and the State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Chinese Academy of Sciences.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Qianqian Yang
    • 1
    • 2
    • 3
  • Lei Hu
    • 1
    • 2
    Email author
  • Siwei Sun
    • 1
    • 2
  • Ling Song
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Information EngineeringChinese Academy of SciencesBeijingChina
  2. 2.Data Assurance and Communication Security Research CenterChinese Academy of SciencesBeijingChina
  3. 3.University of Chinese Academy of SciencesBeijingChina

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