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IFuzzer: An Evolutionary Interpreter Fuzzer Using Genetic Programming

  • Spandan Veggalam
  • Sanjay Rawat
  • Istvan Haller
  • Herbert Bos
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9878)

Abstract

We present an automated evolutionary fuzzing technique to find bugs in JavaScript interpreters. Fuzzing is an automated black box testing technique used for finding security vulnerabilities in the software by providing random data as input. However, in the case of an interpreter, fuzzing is challenging because the inputs are piece of codes that should be syntactically/semantically valid to pass the interpreter’s elementary checks. On the other hand, the fuzzed input should also be uncommon enough to trigger exceptional behavior in the interpreter, such as crashes, memory leaks and failing assertions. In our approach, we use evolutionary computing techniques, specifically genetic programming, to guide the fuzzer in generating uncommon input code fragments that may trigger exceptional behavior in the interpreter. We implement a prototype named IFuzzer to evaluate our technique on real-world examples. IFuzzer uses the language grammar to generate valid inputs. We applied IFuzzer first on an older version of the JavaScript interpreter of Mozilla (to allow for a fair comparison to existing work) and found 40 bugs, of which 12 were exploitable. On subsequently targeting the latest builds of the interpreter, IFuzzer found 17 bugs, of which four were security bugs.

Keywords

Fuzzing System security Vulnerability Genetic programming Evolutionary computing 

Notes

Acknowledgments

This work was partially supported by Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research through the NWO 639.023.309 VICI “Dowsing” project.

We would like to thank Mozilla Security Team and conference reviewers for their useful suggestions to improve the paper.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Spandan Veggalam
    • 1
  • Sanjay Rawat
    • 2
    • 3
  • Istvan Haller
    • 2
    • 3
  • Herbert Bos
    • 2
    • 3
  1. 1.International Institute of Information TechnologyHyderabadIndia
  2. 2.Computer Science InstituteVrije Universiteit AmsterdamAmsterdamThe Netherlands
  3. 3.Department of InformaticsVrije Universiteit AmsterdamAmsterdamThe Netherlands

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