Robust Password-Protected Secret Sharing

  • Michel Abdalla
  • Mario Cornejo
  • Anca Nitulescu
  • David Pointcheval
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9879)

Abstract

Password-protected secret sharing (PPSS) schemes allow a user to publicly share its high-entropy secret across different servers and to later recover it by interacting with some of these servers using only his password without requiring any authenticated data. In particular, this secret will remain safe as long as not too many servers get corrupted. However, servers are not always reliable and the communication can be altered. To address this issue, a robust PPSS should additionally guarantee that a user can recover his secret as long as enough servers provide correct answers, and these are received without alteration. In this paper, we propose new robust PPSS schemes which are significantly more efficient than the existing ones. Our contributions are two-fold: First, we propose a generic technique to build a Robust Gap Threshold Secret Sharing Scheme (RGTSSS) from some threshold secret sharing schemes. In the PPSS construction, this allows us to drop the verifiable property of Oblivious Pseudorandom Functions (OPRF); Then, we use this new approach to design two new robust PPSS schemes that are quite efficient, from two OPRFs. They are proven in the random-oracle model, just because our RGTSSS construction requires random non-malleable fingerprints, which is provided by an ideal hash function.

Keywords

Password-Protected Secret Sharing Robust Gap Threshold Secret Sharing Scheme Oblivious Pseudorandom Functions 

Notes

Acknowledgments

We are grateful to Stanislaw Jarecki for his valuable comments on this work. This work was supported in part by the European Research Council under the European Community’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013 Grant Agreement no. 339563 – CryptoCloud).

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Michel Abdalla
    • 1
  • Mario Cornejo
    • 1
  • Anca Nitulescu
    • 1
  • David Pointcheval
    • 1
  1. 1.ENS, CNRS, INRIA, and PSL Research UniversityParisFrance

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