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When Are Three Voters Enough for Privacy Properties?

  • Myrto ArapinisEmail author
  • Véronique Cortier
  • Steve Kremer
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9879)

Abstract

Protocols for secure electronic voting are of increasing societal importance. Proving rigorously their security is more challenging than many other protocols, which aim at authentication or key exchange. One of the reasons is that they need to be secure for an arbitrary number of malicious voters. In this paper we identify a class of voting protocols for which only a small number of agents needs to be considered: if there is an attack on vote privacy then there is also an attack that involves at most 3 voters (2 honest voters and 1 dishonest voter).

In the case where the protocol allows a voter to cast several votes and counts, e.g., only the last one, we also reduce the number of ballots required for an attack to 10, and under some additional hypotheses, 7 ballots. Our results are formalised and proven in a symbolic model based on the applied pi calculus. We illustrate the applicability of our results on several case studies, including different versions of Helios and Prêt-à-Voter, as well as the JCJ protocol. For some of these protocols we can use the ProVerif tool to provide the first formal proofs of privacy for an unbounded number of voters.

Keywords

Equational Theory Counting Function Symbolic Model Reduction Result Unbounded Number 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgments

This work has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the EU’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program (grant agreement No 645865-SPOOC) and the ANR project SEQUOIA ANR-14-CE28-0030-01.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Myrto Arapinis
    • 1
    Email author
  • Véronique Cortier
    • 2
  • Steve Kremer
    • 2
  1. 1.University of EdinburghEdinburghUK
  2. 2.LORIA, CNRS & Inria Nancy & Université de LorraineNancyFrance

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