The 6W1H Model as a Basis for Systems Assurance Argument

  • Shuji Kinoshita
  • Yoshiki Kinoshita
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9923)


The basis of an assurance argument must be built on top of explicit specification of the target system. Nevertheless, identification of a municipal disaster management system out of existing documents is a non-trivial task. We propose an approach applying 6W1H models. A 6W1H model is a tree of actions equipped with “6Ws” (Who, What, Whom, When, Where, Why) that provide necessary explication of the system for assurance argument. The approach is exemplified by identifying a system and building an assurance case out of water supply activities prescribed in the Local Disaster Management Plan of Hiratsuka city.


Assurance argument Systems modelling Disaster management 



The authors thank the staff of the disaster management department of Hiratsuka city office for clarification of the details of LDMP and fruitful discussions. Dr. Makoto Takeyama gave critical yet insightful and constructive comments on early manuscript of this paper. The authors are also grateful to the support of Mr. KojOkuno.

This work was partially supported by the Research Initiative on Advanced Software Engineering (RISE) by the Information-technology Promotion Agency (IPA), Japan.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Information SciencesKanagawa UniversityHiratsukaJapan
  2. 2.Research Institute for Programming ScienceKanagawa UniversityHiratsukaJapan

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