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Limitation and Improvement of STPA-Sec for Safety and Security Co-analysis

  • Christoph SchmittnerEmail author
  • Zhendong Ma
  • Peter Puschner
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9923)

Abstract

Safety-critical Cyber-physical Systems (CPS) in vehicles are becoming more and more complex and interconnected. There is a pressing need for holistic approaches for safety and security analysis to address the challenges. System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) is a top-down safety hazard analysis method, based on systems theory especially aimed at such systems. In contrast to established approaches, hazards are treated as a control problem rather than a reliability problem. STPA-Sec extends this approach to also include security analysis. However, when we applied STPA-Sec to real world use cases for joint safety and security analysis, a Battery Management System for a hybrid vehicle, we observed several limitations of the security extension. We propose improvements to address these limitations for a combined safety and security analysis. Our improvements lead to a better identification of high level security scenarios. We evaluate the feasibility of the improved co-analysis method in a self-optimizing battery management system. We also discuss the general applicability of STPA-Sec to high level safety and security analysis and the relation to automotive cybersecurity standards.

Keywords

Cyber-physical systems Safety and security co-analysis STAMP STPA-Sec Automotive cybersecurity 

Notes

Acknowledgement

This work is partially supported by EU ARTEMIS project AMASS (contract no. 692474) and Austrian Research Promotion Agency FFG on behalf of Austrian Federal Ministry of Transport, Innovation and Technology BMVIT.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Christoph Schmittner
    • 1
    Email author
  • Zhendong Ma
    • 1
  • Peter Puschner
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Digital Safety and SecurityAIT Austrian Institute of TechnologyViennaAustria
  2. 2.Department of Computer EngineeringVienna University of TechnologyViennaAustria

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