Towards Security-Explicit Formal Modelling of Safety-Critical Systems

  • Elena Troubitsyna
  • Linas Laibinis
  • Inna Pereverzeva
  • Tuomas Kuismin
  • Dubravka Ilic
  • Timo Latvala
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9922)

Abstract

Modern industrial control systems become increasingly interconnected and rely on external networks to provide their services. Hence they become vulnerable to security attacks that might directly jeopardise their safety. The growing understanding that if the system is not secure then it is not safe calls for novel development and verification techniques weaving security consideration into the safety-driven design. In this paper, we demonstrate how to make explicit the relationships between safety and security in the formal system development by refinement. The proposed approach allows the designers to identify at early design states mutual interdependencies between the mechanisms ensuring safety and security and build robust system architecture.

Notes

Acknowledgements

This work is partially funded by the TEKES project Cyber Trust.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Elena Troubitsyna
    • 1
  • Linas Laibinis
    • 1
  • Inna Pereverzeva
    • 1
  • Tuomas Kuismin
    • 2
  • Dubravka Ilic
    • 2
  • Timo Latvala
    • 2
  1. 1.Åbo Akademi UniversityTurkuFinland
  2. 2.Space Systems FinlandEspooFinland

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