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Revenue Maximizing Markets for Zero-Day Exploits

  • Mingyu Guo
  • Hideaki Hata
  • Ali Babar
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9862)

Abstract

Markets for zero-day exploits (software vulnerabilities unknown to the vendor) have a long history and a growing popularity. We study these markets from a revenue-maximizing mechanism design perspective. We first propose a theoretical model for zero-day exploits markets. In our model, one exploit is being sold to multiple buyers. There are two kinds of buyers, which we call the defenders and the offenders. The defenders are buyers who buy vulnerabilities in order to fix them (e.g., software vendors). The offenders, on the other hand, are buyers who intend to utilize the exploits (e.g., national security agencies and police). Our model is more than a single-item auction. First, an exploit is a piece of information, so one exploit can be sold to multiple buyers. Second, buyers have externalities. If one defender wins, then the exploit becomes worthless to the offenders. Third, if we disclose the details of the exploit to the buyers before the auction, then they may leave with the information without paying. On the other hand, if we do not disclose the details, then it is difficult for the buyers to come up with their private valuations. Considering the above, our proposed mechanism discloses the details of the exploit to all offenders before the auction. The offenders then pay to delay the exploit being disclosed to the defenders.

Keywords

Revenue maximization Mechanism design Security economics Bug bounty 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Computer ScienceUniversity of AdelaideAdelaideAustralia
  2. 2.Graduate School of Information ScienceNara Institute of Science TechnologyIkomaJapan

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