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The Pragmatics of Scepticism

  • Pierluigi ChiassoniEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology book series (PEPRPHPS, volume 10)

Abstract

My aim in this paper is arguing for interpretive scepticism from a pragmatics point of view. The argument will develop in four steps. In the first step, I will lay down the conceptual framework I am going to use. In the second step, I will make clear what I consider scepticism and formalism to be. Here, I will contrast scepticism (non-cognitivism) with two varieties of formalism (integral and restricted cognitivism, respectively), and set forth a few criticisms of them. In the third step, I will consider a sophisticated version of restricted cognitivism: the one defended by Andrei Marmor in a series of valuable essays. Marmor makes his case by resorting to philosophy of language. I will argue, however, that philosophy of language, and pragmatics as a substantive part thereof, far from providing support for the restricted form of cognitivism Marmor advocates, suggest contrariwise that it should be abandoned. In the fourth, and last, step, I will lay down the outline of a pragmatic interpretivist theory of judicial interpretation.

Keywords

Legal interpretation Formalism Scepticism Philosophy of language Pragmatics 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.TILPH – Tarello Institute for Legal Philosophy, Department of LawUniversità degli Studi di GenovaGenovaItaly

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