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Ring Oscillators and Hardware Trojan Detection

  • Paris Kitsos
  • Nicolas Sklavos
  • Artemios G. Voyiatzis
Chapter

Abstract

Hardware Trojan horses is a realistic threat in the modern IC supply chain. Once the associate risk is considered, appropriate defense mechanisms must be designed and employed at the various stages in order to detect such hardware malware. We propose two novel uses of ring oscillators, one as an attack vector against hardware implementations of true random number generators and one as an on-chip detection method for Trojans. We show that the transient-effect ring oscillators (TERO) of appropriate length are very sensitive even to small modifications of the monitored circuit and can be a viable alternative to detection based on conventional ring oscillators. Finally, we discuss an outlook to the future of hardware Trojan defenses.

Keywords

Trojan Horse Ring Oscillator Cryptographic Algorithm Physically Uncloneable Function Reset Signal 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgements

This work was supported in part by the EU COST Action IC1204 Trustworthy Manufacturing and Utilization of Secure Devices (TRUDEVICE), the GSRT Action “KRIPIS” with national (Greece) and EU funds, in the context of the research project “ISRTDI” while P. Kitsos and A.G. Voyiatzis were with the Industrial Systems Institute of the “Athena” Research and Innovation Center in ICT and Knowledge Technologies, and the COMET K1 program by the Austrian Research Promotion Agency (FFG), while A.G. Voyiatzis was with SBA Research.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Paris Kitsos
    • 1
  • Nicolas Sklavos
    • 2
  • Artemios G. Voyiatzis
    • 3
  1. 1.Computer and Informatics Engineering DepartmentTEI of Western GreeceAntirioGreece
  2. 2.Computer Engineering and Informatics DepartmentUniversity of PatrasPatrasGreece
  3. 3.SBA ResearchViennaAustria

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