Winners and Losers from Price-Level Volatility: Money Taxation and Information Frictions

Part of the Studies in Economic Theory book series (ECON.THEORY, volume 31)


We analyze an economy with taxes and transfers denominated in dollars and an information friction. It is the information friction that allows for volatility in equilibrium prices and allocations. When the price level is expected to be stable, the competitive equilibrium allocation is Pareto optimal. When the price level is volatile, it is not Pareto optimal, but the stable equilibrium allocations do not necessarily dominate the volatile ones. There can be winners and losers from volatility. We identify winners and losers and describe the effect on them of increases in volatility. Our analysis is an application of the weak axiom of revealed preference in the tax-adjusted Edgeworth box.


Price Level Expected Utility Security Market Spot Market Equilibrium Allocation 
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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of St.GallenSt.GallenSwitzerland
  2. 2.University of BirminghamBirminghamEngland
  3. 3.Nanyang Technological UniversitySingaporeSingapore
  4. 4.Cornell UniversityIthacaUSA

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