The Conventional Instruments of Macroprudential Policy

  • Richard Barwell
Chapter
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Abstract

Any instrument of economic policy should exhibit a number of key properties. First, the policymaker should have the legal authority to use the instrument and should not be constrained in its use. Second, that instrument should be effective, in that use of the instrument has a significant and sufficiently rapid impact on the objectives of policy. Third, that transmission should be stable and predictable, in that use of the instrument does not inject uncertainty into the system. Fourth, the instrument should be cost-effective, in that use of the instrument does not entail significant undesirable side effects for the broader goals of the social planner.

Keywords

House Price Housing Market Balance Sheet Capital Structure Regulatory Standard 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Richard Barwell
    • 1
  1. 1.BNP Paribas Investment PartnersDartfordUK

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