Game-Specific and Player-Specific Knowledge Combine to Drive Transfer of Learning Between Games of Strategic Interaction
Trust in others transfers between games of strategic interaction (e.g., iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma– PD and Chicken Game – CG). This transfer of trust represents knowledge acquired about the other player (player-specific knowledge), carrying over from one situation to another, which is separate from what was learned about the previous game (game-specific knowledge). We examine how the transfer of both player-specific and game-specific knowledge informs one’s decisions when interacting with a new player. In this paper, we present the experimental design of an upcoming study, where participants will sequentially play two games of strategic interaction (PD & CG) with the same or a different computerized confederate agent. In addition to the experimental design, we present model predictions, using a previously published computational cognitive model of trust dynamics. The model predicts transfer of learning effects in both conditions and larger effects when interacting with the same agent.
KeywordsTrust dynamics Strategic interaction Model predictions Multiple agent interaction Behavioral game theory
This research was supported by The Air Force Office of Scientific Research grant number FA9550-14-1-0206 to Ion Juvina. The authors also would like to thank the Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education who supported this research by appointing Michael Collins to the Student Research Participant Program at the U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory’s 711th Human Performance Wing, Cognitive Models and Agents Branch.
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