IDT 2016: Intelligent Decision Technologies 2016 pp 129-139 | Cite as
The Shapley Value on a Class of Cooperative Games Under Incomplete Information
Conference paper
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Abstract
In this paper, we study cooperative TU games in which the worths of some coalitions are not known. We investigate superadditive games and the Shapley values on a class of cooperative games under incomplete information. We show that the set of the superadditive complete games and the set of the Shapley values which can be obtained from a given incomplete game are polytopes and propose selection methods of the one-point solution from the set of the Shapley values.
Keywords
Cooperative game Partially defined cooperative game Superadditive game Shapley valueReferences
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