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Attack Tree Analysis for Insider Threats on the IoT Using Isabelle

  • Florian Kammüller
  • Jason R. C. Nurse
  • Christian W. Probst
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9750)

Abstract

The Internet-of-Things (IoT) aims at integrating small devices around humans. The threat from human insiders in “regular” organisations is real; in a fully-connected world of the IoT, organisations face a substantially more severe security challenge due to unexpected access possibilities and information flow. In this paper, we seek to illustrate and classify insider threats in relation to the IoT (by ‘smart insiders’), exhibiting attack vectors for their characterisation. To model the attacks we apply a method of formal modelling of Insider Threats in the interactive theorem prover Isabelle. On the classified IoT attack examples, we show how this logical approach can be used to make the models more precise and to analyse the previously identified Insider IoT attacks using Isabelle attack trees.

Keywords

Smart Device High Order Logic Attack Tree Global Policy Inside Attack 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Florian Kammüller
    • 1
  • Jason R. C. Nurse
    • 2
  • Christian W. Probst
    • 3
  1. 1.Middlesex University LondonLondonUK
  2. 2.University of OxfordOxfordUK
  3. 3.Technical University DenmarkKongens LyngbyDenmark

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