Design Considerations for Building Cyber Deception Systems

  • Greg BriskinEmail author
  • Dan Fayette
  • Nick Evancich
  • Vahid Rajabian-Schwart
  • Anthony Macera
  • Jason Li


Cyber deception can become an essential component of organizing cyber operations in the modern cyber landscape. Cyber defenders and mission commanders can use cyber deception as an effective means for protecting mission cyber assets and ensuring mission success, through deceiving and diverting adversaries during the course of planning and execution of cyber operations and missions. To enable effective integration of cyber deception, it would be necessary to create a systematic design process for building a robust and sustainable deception system with extensible deception capabilities guided by a Command and Control interface compatible with current Department of Defense and civilian cyber operational practices and standards. In this chapter, the authors discuss various design aspects of designing cyber deception systems that meet a wide range of cyber operational requirements and are appropriately aligned with mission objectives. These design aspects include general deception goals, deception design taxonomy, tradeoff analysis, deception design process, design considerations such as modularity, interfaces and effect to cyber defenders, interoperability with current tools, deception scenarios, adversary engagement, roles of deception in cyber kill chains, and metrics such as adversary work factor. The authors expect to present the challenges and opportunities of designing cyber deception systems and to trigger further thoughts and discussions in the broader research community.


Software Define Networking Attack Scenario Tradeoff Analysis Mission Operation Access Control List 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


  1. 1.
    FM101-5_mdmp. “The Military Decision-Making Process”Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    “THE JOINT OPERATION PLANNING PROCESS FOR AIR,” Last Updated: 09 November 2012Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    “Command and Control of Joint Air Operations”, Joint Publication 3–30, 10 February 2014Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Joint Publication 1–13.4 “Military Deception”, 26 January 2012Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    “Thwarting Cyber-Attack Reconnaissance with Inconsistency and Deception”, by Neil C. Rowe and Han C. GohGoogle Scholar
  6. 6.
  7. 7.
    NIST Pub 800.53, Rev.4 SC26-SC30Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    CERIAS Tech Report 2015–11 “Using Deception to Enhance Security: A Taxonomy, Model, and Novel Uses”, by Mohammed H. Almeshekah, Center for Education and Research Information Assurance and Security, Perdue UniversityGoogle Scholar
  9. 9.
    Joint Publication 3-12(R) “Cyberspace Operations”, 5 Feb 2013Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    “Cyber Resiliency & Agility – Call to Action”, by Suzanne Hassell, MITRE Resiliency Workshop May 31, 2012Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    “Planning Cost-Effective Deceptive Resource Denial in Defense to Cyber-Attacks”, by Neil Rowe. In Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Information Warfare & Security, page 177. Academic Conferences Limited, 2007Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    “Cheating and Deception”, by J. Bowyer Bell and Barton Whaley. Transaction Publishers New Brunswick, 1991.Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    “The Essence of Winning and Losing”, by Boyd, John, R., 28 June 1995.Google Scholar
  14. 14.
    “Defending Cyberspace with Fake Honeypots”, by Neil Rowe, E. John Custy, and Binh T. Duong. Journal of Computers, 2(2):25–36, 2007.Google Scholar
  15. 15.
    “Victory and Deceit: Deception and Trickery at War”, by James F. Dunnigan and Albert A. Nofi. Writers Club Press, 2001.Google Scholar
  16. 16.
    “Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises”, by Raymond S. Nickerson. Review of General Psychology, 2(2):175–220, June 1998Google Scholar
  17. 17.
    “Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment”, by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman. Psychological review, 90(4):293–315, 1983.Google Scholar
  18. 18.
    “Intelligence-Driven Computer Network Defense Informed by Analysis of Adversary Campaigns and Intrusion Kill Chains”, by Eric M. Hutchins, Michael J. Cloppert, and Rohan M. Amin, Leading Issues in Information Warfare & Security Research, 1:80, 2011.Google Scholar
  19. 19.
    “Fortitude: The D-Day Deception Campaign”, Roger Hesketh. Overlook Hardcover, Woodstock, NY, 2000.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Greg Briskin
    • 1
    Email author
  • Dan Fayette
    • 1
  • Nick Evancich
    • 1
  • Vahid Rajabian-Schwart
    • 2
  • Anthony Macera
    • 2
  • Jason Li
    • 1
  1. 1.Intelligent Automation Inc.RockvilleUK
  2. 2.Air Force Research LaboratoryRomeUK

Personalised recommendations