How Can Cooperative Game Theory Be Made More Relevant to Economics? : An Open Problem

  • Eric MaskinEmail author


Game Theory pioneers J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern gave most of their attention to the cooperative side of the subject. But cooperative game theory has had relatively little effect on economics. In this essay, I suggest why that might be and what is needed for cooperative theory to become more relevant to economics.


Nash Equilibrium Cooperative Game Grand Coalition Noncooperative Game Cooperative Game Theory 
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I acknowledge research support from the Rilin Fund at Harvard University.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsHarvard University, Littauer CenterCambridgeUSA
  2. 2.Higher School of EconomicsMoscowRussia

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