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Value Uncertainty

  • Niklas Möller
Chapter
Part of the Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning book series (LARI, volume 10)

Abstract

In many decision-situations, we are uncertain not only about the facts but also about our own values that we intend to apply to the problem. Which values are at stake, and whether and how those values compare may not always be clear to us. This chapter introduces the issue and discusses some ways to deal with value uncertainty in practical decision-making. In particular, four types of uncertainty of values are introduced: uncertainty about which values we endorse, uncertainty about the specific content of the values we do endorse, uncertainty about which among our values apply to the problem at hand, and the relative weight among different values we endorse. Various ways of contributing to solving value uncertainty are then discussed: contextualization, hierarchy of values, assigning strength to values, embedding and transforming the problem. Furthermore, two methods of dealing with value uncertainty remaining even after these methods have been applied are treated.

Keywords

Value uncertainty Fact-value distinction Contextualization Normative theorizing Argumentation Reflective equilibrium 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy and the History of TechnologyRoyal Institute of Technology (KTH)StockholmSweden

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